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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jose De Jesus Quezada appeals from the judgment of dismissal of his Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief entered following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal,
he asserts that the district court's denial of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
that accrued when his attorney advised him to enter an A!ford 1 plea to burglary
(amended from felony stalking) without making him aware of, let alone discussing with
him, the fact that the symptoms of his schizophrenia provided a plausible defense that
he did not have the requisite mental state to be guilty of either burglary or felony
stalking.

Because the evidence of deficient performance and prejudice on this claim

was uncontroverted, the district court erred when it failed to grant Mr. Quezada relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following his Alford plea to burglary (amended from felony stalking), Jose De
Jesus Quezada filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter Verified
Petition). {R., p.60.) One of the claims 2 raised by Mr. Quezada was that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his decision to enter an Alford plea
when his attorney failed to advise him that the symptoms of his schizophrenia provided
a plausible defense that he lacked the requisite mental state to be guilty of either
burglary or felony stalking. (R., pp.60-70.)

Se~ North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Mr. Quezada raised several other claims in his Verified Petition, all of which were
dismissed. He does not pursue his other claims on appeal.
1

2

1

Following an evidentiary hearing at which the entire post-conviction file, including
his Verified Petition, was judicially-noticed, and at which Mr. Quezada presented three
witnesses (see Tr.), the district court issued an order dismissing his Verified Petition
(R., pp.123-30), followed by a judgment of dismissal. (R., p.132.) The district court did
not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law as to Mr. Quezada's claim that his
attorney was ineffective in failing to advise him that the symptoms of his schizophrenia
would have provided a plausible defense at trial to the requisite mental state to be guilty
of burglary or felony stalking. (R., pp.123-30.) However, the district court did issue a
judgment of dismissal, disposing of the entire Verified Petition. (R., p.132.)
Mr.

GLCAUU

filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.134.)

2

ISSUE
which the evidence
Did the district court err when, following an evidentiary hearing
establishing deficient performance and prejudice was uncontroverted, it denied
Mr. Quezada post-conviction relief on his claim that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel relating to his Alford plea when his attorney failed to advise him that the
symptoms of his schizophrenia would have provided a plausible defense that he did not
have the requisite mental state to be guilty of burglary or felony stalking?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When, Following An Evidentiary Hearing At Which The
Evidence Establishing Deficient Performance And Prejudice Was Uncontroverted, It
Denied Mr. Quezada Post-Conviction Relief On His Claim That He Received Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Relating To His Alford Plea When His Attorney Failed To Advise
Him That The Symptoms Of His Schizophrenia Would Have Provided A Plausible
Defense That He Did Not Have The Requisite Mental State To Be Guilty Of Burglary Or
Felony Stalking

A.

Introduction
In a timely Verified Petition, Jose De Jesus Quezada claimed, inter alia, that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his Alford plea when his attorney
failed to advise him that the symptoms of his schizophrenia would have provided a
viable defense that he did not have the requisite mental state to be guilty of burglary or
felony stalking.
At the evidentiary hearing, uncontroverted evidence was presented that
Mr. Quezada, a schizophrenic who was charged with felony stalking for his irrational
behavior toward two girls under sixteen years of age, acting on the advice of counsel,
entered an Alford plea to the greater3 charge of burglary without having been informed
of a plausible defense, namely that the symptoms of his schizophrenia prevented him
from forming the requisite mens rea to have committed either burglary or felony stalking.
The district court did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to
this claim, disposing of it by way of a general judgment of dismissal.

Burglary carries a penalty of "not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years" in
prison. I.C. § 18-1403. Felony stalking carries a penalty of "not less than one (1) year
nor more than five (5) years" in prison. I.C. § 18-7905(4).

3

4

Mr. Quezada

that, in light of the uncontroverted facts that support his

claim, and the application of those

to the law, the district court

denied his request for post-conviction relief.

when it

He respectfully requests that this Court

vacate the judgment dismissing his Verified Petition, and remand this matter for the
entry of an order granting his request that his conviction be vacated. 4

B.

Standard Of Review
"When an appellate review of a district court's denial of post-conviction relief

follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a summary dismissal, the evidence must be
'viewed most favorably

the trial court's findings."' McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847,

fact, "an appellate court has nothing to which it may grant deference." Id. at 850. In all
such appeals, the appellate court freely reviews the application of the law to the facts.
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When, Following An Evidentiary Hearing At Which The
Evidence
Establishing
Deficient
Performance
And
Prejudice
Was
Uncontroverted, It Denied Mr. Quezada Post-Conviction Relief On His Claim
That He Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Relating To His Alford Plea
When His Attorney Failed To Advise Him That The Symptoms Of His
Schizophrenia Would Have Provided A Plausible Defense That He Did Not Have
The Requisite Mental State To Be Guilty Of Burglary Or Felony Stalking
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner

must satisfy a two-prong test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The

4

Obviously, Mr. Quezada would not receive a windfall from this request, as the plea
agreement would be voided, resulting in the reinstatement of a misdemeanor charge
dismissed pursuant to the agreement and would leave the felony stalking charge
pending.

5

two prongs are: (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice resulting from the deficient

Id.

In

what constitutes deficient performance, "[t]he proper

measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms." Id. at 688. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "The starting
point in evaluating counsel's conduct under the

constitution remains the American

Bar Association's standards entitled 'The Defense Function."' State v. Charboneau, 116
Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425
(1991).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, when applying the Strickland
prejudice prong with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a
guilty plea, "[i]n order to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner is required to show that as a
result of counsel's deficient performance 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial."' Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 71, 76 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985)).
The

allegation

of ineffective

assistance of counsel

in

connection

with

Mr. Quezada's Alford plea stemmed from a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which he
alleged counsel failed to investigate, including whether his schizophrenia could have
prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary to commit either burglary or
stalking, and pursue before he entered an Alford plea because:
Had he understood his defenses, including that the symptoms of
schizophrenia were relevant to the specific intent elements of the charge,
he would not have entered into the plea agreement and would have
instead taken the case to trial. Had he presented his case to a jury, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him of
stalking.

6

(R., pp.65-67.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court

judicial notice of the contents of

the post-conviction file, which included Mr. Quezada's Verified Petition. (Tr., p.15, L.23
- p.16, L.4.)

The Verified Petition included the fact that, beginning in late 2009,

"Mr. Quezada began to act differently ... including laughing and smiling to himself for
no apparent reason. During the lunch hour, he would stay in his car instead of joining
the other workers and he refused to eat." (R., p.61.)
Additional evidence that Mr. Quezada likely suffered from schizophrenia at the
time of the charged conduct, causing him to lack the requisite mental state to have
committed the crimes of stalking or burglary, included the following:
12. Mr. Quezada began to isolate himself from his family and act
strangely. For instance, Mr. Quezada was found sleeping in his car
outside his parent's [sic] home he had not even told his parents he was
outside although he was welcome there. On another occasion, when
Mr. Quezada did spend the night at his parent's [sic] house, his sister
Maria found him during the night with his hands covering his ears. When
asked, Mr. Quezada said he was trying to keep the voices out.
13. On another occasion, Mr. Quezada refused to eat or participate in a
birthday party for one of his nephews. Mr. Quezada's behavior, described
in this and preceding paragraphs seemed out of character for him and
family began to grow concerned that he was becoming ill like his brother
and father.
14. In approximately early summer 2010, Mr. Quezada left his
construction job and family and came to Idaho without telling anyone. In
Idaho, Mr. Quezada's behavior continued to deteriorate. He continued to
isolate himself, exhibit poor social skills, to have difficulty communicating
and to laugh or smile for no apparent reason.
He also behaved
irrationally, including offering to give the money that he had saved over the
years to others.
15. On November 3, 2010, the State alleged that Mr. Quezada committed
the crime of Stalking between September 11, 2010 and November 1,
2010, by "willfully, maliciously and repeatedly" stalking two juvenile
females.

7

16. Mr. Quezada only intended to talk to and get to know the girls.
no intention to harm them or to
physical contact with them.

38. Mr. Quezada had no intent to harm or frighten anyone when he
engaged in the conduct that resulted in the underlying criminal charges
and did not act maliciously.
(R., pp.61-62, 65.)
!n addition to the contents of the post-conviction file, the evidence before the
court included testimony from several witnesses, including his former attorney and the
person who conducted a pre-sentence mental health evaluation of Mr. Quezada.
Richard Hanks, Mr. Quezada's former attorney, testified that,

the plea hearing,

requested a mental health evaluation of Mr. Quezada because "[t)he behavior that he
was accused of was strange ... his sister had indicated to me that he had a [twin 5]
brother that had schizophrenia and there was a little bit of odd behavior occasionally
when I would meet with him." (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-10.) Despite Mr. Quezada's odd behavior
and the information he had learned from his family about his mental health issues,
Mr. Hanks had no concerns as to Mr. Quezada's ability to aid and assist in his own
defense. (Tr., p.10, L13-p.11, L.14.)
The next witness was Daniel Hall, "a clinician with adult mental health" who also
conducts Idaho Code § 19-2524 mental health evaluations for the court.

(Tr., p.22,

The Verified Petition includes the following: "In approximately 2009, Mr. Quezada's
twin brother Andres began to exhibit signs of mental illness, including hearing voices,
being religiously preoccupied, not eating and talking to himself. Andres began receiving
mental health treatment in January of 2010 and was diagnosed with Schizophrenia,
Undifferentiated Type."
(R., p.61.)
His father also "appeared to suffer from
schizophrenia." (R., p.61.) These familial instances of schizophrenia are significant, as
"[s]chizophrenia is a genetically based illness and tends to run in families." (R., p.63.)
5

8

Ls.12-1

)

Mr. Hall conducted an evaluation of Mr. Quezada as part of the pre-

sentence investigation process, concluding that Mr. Quezada likely suffered from
schizophrenia, registered a score of 30 on the global assessment of functioning,
including

"responding to delusions or hallucinations," and that his mental illness

impaired his ability to function. (Tr., p.37, L.4

p.40, L.15.) One of the "big factors" in

his opinion was "his report of what happened walking into the girl's home uninvited but
then apparently leaving when asked to, just kind of not very aware and alert to what he
is doing or what kind of consequence his behavior might cause in the community."
(Tr., p.45, L.20 - p.21, L.3.)
As will be seen below, this uncontroverted evidence compelled a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel, necessitating the grant of relief, namely, vacating the
judgment of conviction, withdrawing Mr. Quezada's Alford plea, and setting the matter
for a trial on the merits.

1.

Deficient Performance

Two of the American Bar Association's standards regarding the function of
defense counsel apply in assessing counsel's deficient performance in advising
Mr. Quezada to enter an Alford plea to the greater charge of burglary.

The first

provides, "After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense
counsel should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the
case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome."

AMERICAN BAR

ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1993)
(hereinafter, ABA STANDARDS)§ 4-5.1 (a). The other, in relevant part, provides, "Under

9

no circumstances should defense counsel recommend

to a defendant acceptance of a

unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has

completed,

including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced at trial."
ABA STANDARDS§ 4-6.1 (b).

A criminal defense attorney's failure to identify a potential defense and advise a
defendant of it, prior to counseling the defendant to plead guilty, constitutes deficient
performance under Strickland. See Heard v. Addison, 728 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2013);

see also United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011) ("If the facts
Mr. Weeks alleged in his petition are true, then he has made a credible claim that his
plea was involuntary because of his attorney's ineffectiveness . . . According to the
petition, Mr. Weeks' counsel failed to properly advise Mr. Weeks of the charges in the
second superseding indictment. As a result, he did not understand that his lack of intent
to commit a crime, i.e., his lack of knowledge of the illegality of the activities to which he
had agreed, provided a valid defense to the conspiracy charge.").
In Heard, the court considered the dismissal, without a factual hearing, of a claim
that Heard received ineffective assistance when, prior to advising entry of a guilty plea,
his attorney failed to discover two unpublished appellate opinions interpreting the
provision of the statute under which he was charged in a way that could have provided
him with a basis for arguing that his conduct was not criminal. Id. at 1179-80. The court
began its analysis by recognizing that "[a] criminal defense lawyer has a duty to conduct
reasonable investigations into her client's case, which extends to the law as well as the
facts." Id. at 1180 (citation omitted).

10

In concluding that Heard had established deficient performance, the court noted,
from the failure to discover the [court's] unpublished decisions ... we hold
that, on this record, minimally competent counsel would have recognized a likely
defense based on the statute's text and the [court's] failure to provide a permissible
narrowing construction in its published cases." Id. The court further held that, even
assuming that trial counsel had known of the cases, her performance still would have
been deficient because the evidence was undisputed that she had not advised Heard as
to the cases and the possibility of a viable defense. 6 Id. at 1182 n.5.
Failure to pursue a defense of lack of mens rea due to mental health problems
has

found to be deficient. In Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), an

appeal from the summary denial of habeas relief, it was alleged, inter a/ia, that trial
counsel in a capital murder case was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense that, due
to organic brain damage, Brubaker was incapable of forming the mental state necessary
to have committed the crime. Brubaker, 310 F.2d at 38. In concluding that Brubaker
had raised allegations sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the claim, the court
explained that Brubaker was not claiming "that after investigation and research trial
counsel made decisions of tactics and strategy injurious to appellant's cause," but
"rather that trial counsel failed to prepare, and that appellant's defense was withheld not
through deliberate though faulty judgment, but in default of knowledge that reasonable
inquiry would have produced, and hence in default of any judgment at all." Id. at 39
(footnote omitted).

The court explained that, "[i]f true," the allegations "constituted a

6

Ultimately, after analyzing the prejudice prong, the court ordered that relief be granted,
declining to remand for a factual hearing, as doing so was unnecessary. Id. at 1186
n.7.
11

total failure to present the cause of the accused in any fundamental respect," and that
such a trial would not have

the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of a fair

trial. Id. (quotation marks and footnote omitted)
With respect to the deficient performance prong in this case, the evidence was
uncontroverted that "[t]rial counsel did not inform Mr. Quezada that he had potential
defenses to the specific intent elements of the crime charged." (R., p.65.) His own
attorney acknowledged that the behavior of which he was accused was "strange,"
causing him to request a mental health evaluation as part of the pre-sentence
investigation. Daniel Hall, the mental health clinician, explained that one of the "major
factors" in causing him to conclude that Mr. Quezada's ability to function was impaired
was the conduct of which he was accused, namely entering another person's home
without permission while "not very aware and alert to what he is doing or what kind of
consequence his behavior might cause in the community." Finally, as will be discussed
below, both the district court and the State acknowledged the major role Mr. Quezada's
mental illness played in the conduct for which he was charged.

In light of this

uncontroverted evidence, the district court was compelled to conclude that Mr. Quezada
established deficient performance when his attorney advised him to enter an Alford plea
without first investigating and advising him of the availability of the defense that he
lacked the requisite specific intent to be guilty.

2.

Prejudice

In order to satisfy the prejudice prong on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in pleading guilty, the "petitioner must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v.

12

Kentucky, 559 U.

356, 372 (2010). In

Ovv<vv

the rationality of a petitioner's claim

that he would have rejected the plea bargain and proceeded to trial, "[W]here the
alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative
defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely
on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial." Hill, 474 U.S.
at 59 (citation omitted). "[T]hese predictions of the outcome of a possible trial, where
necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the 'idiosyncrasies of the
particular decisionmaker."'

Id. at 59-60 (citation omitted).

An examination of the

defense at issue is necessary to assess the denial of Mr. Quezada's claim.
While Idaho is one of only a handful of states to have abolished the insanity
7

a criminal defendant retains the right to present evidence "on the issue of any

state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the rules of evidence."
I.C. § 18-207(3). Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1506 provides the framework within
which a jury is to assess a claim that a defendant's mental condition has prevented the
defendant from acting with the mental state required to commit a crime. That instruction
reads as follows:
For the defendant to be guilty of [name of offense], the state must prove
the defendant had a particular [state of mind] [purpose] [motive] [intent].
Evidence was offered that the defendant was suffering from a mental
illness at the time of the alleged offense. You should consider the
defendant's mental condition in determining whether the defendant had
that required [state of mind] [purpose] [motive] [intent].
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant was capable of forming such [state of mind] [purpose] [motive]
[intent], you must find the defendant not guilty.

7

See State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 124 n.1 (2011) ("Idaho is one of four states that
have abolished the insanity defense.").
13

I.C.J.L 1506 (brackets in original).
Idaho

Court and

United

recognized the applicability and importance of this mens rea

rt
See Clark v.

Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 768 n.38 (2006) ("[E]vidence of behavior close to the time of the

act charged may indicate both

actual state of mind at that time and also an enduring

incapacity to form the criminal state of mind necessary to the offense charged.")
(citation omitted); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 429 (1991) ("[T]hose individuals who
are incapable of forming the necessary intent needed for the crime are protected by the
mens rea requirements of LC.§§ 18-114, 18-115 and 18-207.") (footnotes omitted);
Delling, 1

Idaho at 130 ("Applied here, nothing in the statute

testifying about Delling's ability

a witness from

form the requisite intent required to commit murder.

In the absence of an insanity defense, Delling is still able to present a defense; it just
takes a different form. If the state cannot prove criminal intent beyond a reasonable
doubt, a defendant, sane or not, will be found not guilty.").
Burglary, the charge to which Mr. Quezada entered an Alford plea, is a specific
intent crime. See Idaho Code § 18-1401; see also State v. Whitfield, 108 Idaho 877,
879 (Ct. App. 1985) ("A critical element which the state must prove in any burglary case
is an entry into a building with the specific intent to commit 'theft or any felony."')
(citation omitted). The charge of burglary to which Mr. Quezada agreed to enter a plea
included "the precise language that the defendant 'entered a room with the intent to
commit any theft or any felony."' (State's Exhibit No. 1, p.1.)

14

For Mr. Quezada to have been found guilty of the original charge of felony
stalking, 8 the State would have had to prove, inter alia, that he "knowingly and

maliciously . .. [e]ngage[d] in a course of conduct that seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed] or
harass[ed] the victim and [was] such as would cause a reasonable person substantial
emotional distress ... [or] would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or
physical injury . . . . " I.C. § 18-7906(1) (emphasis added).

Idaho Code§ 18-101(4)

provides, "The words 'malice,' and 'maliciously,' import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption of law."

I.C. § 18-101(4).

Idaho Code § 18-101(5), in relevant part,

provides, "The word 'knowingly,' imports only a knowledge that the

which

bring the act or omission within the provisions of this code." I.C. § 18-101 (5).
At the hearing

which Mr. Quezada entered his Alford plea, defense counsel

acknowledged that Mr. Quezada denied having the requisite intent to have committed
the offense, explaining,
Your Honor, the - I think what the State would seek to prove, from our
prelim that we had on this case is that Mr. Quezada engaged in a course
of conduct that would be felony Stalking because the child is under the
age of 16.
And as I said, Mr. Quezada does not agree that that was his intent, to
cause any harm or to commit that felony when he went into the home, but
he does acknowledge that he had no permission to go into the room, Your
Honor.
(Plea Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.5 (R., p.36).) In requesting a mental health evaluation at
the plea hearing, defense counsel explained, "There are indications of some mental

8

The charge was a felony because the alleged victims were under sixteen. I.C. § 18-

7905( 1)( C ).

15

health issues with his behavior ... I think the family believes, with his behavior in this
that there was

that he was starting to have similar

to his

And

the conduct that we discussed isn't entirely rational conduct .... " (Plea Tr., p.20, L.13
p.21, L.14.)
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel explained that "a few things" caused
him to request a mental health evaluation, including the fact that "[t]he behavior he was
accused of was strange."

(Tr., p.9, Ls.6-7.)

At the sentencing hearing, defense

counsel, explaining Mr. Quezada's conduct, stated, "I think that that behavior is
consistent with this diagnosis of schizophrenia and with what the family has been
reporting as his behavior over the last year to year-and-a-half." (Sent. Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.)
Finally, both the prosecuting attorney and the district court recognized the role
that Mr. Quezada's mental illness played in causing him to engage in the conduct for
which he entered a plea. At sentencing, the prosecuting attorney explained, "[A]t that
prelim, it became apparent to me that the defendant was likely suffering from mental
illness because his behavior just seemed very peculiar and odd.
mitigating circumstance that the Court should consider."

I think that's a

(Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.20-24.)

While sentencing Mr. Quezada, the district court noted,
[Y]ou have a tendency to be deluded and to pursue those delusions
repeatedly in the face of being told to stay away, which frankly, in this
case, is very frightening both to the family of the victim, to the victim, and
troubling for this Court, because I don't have any assurance from anybody
that says that that's not going to happen again.
(Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.2-8.)
Nothing in the post-conviction evidentiary record contradicts the evidence
presented by Mr. Quezada that defense counsel failed to advise him that the symptoms
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of his mental illness could have provided a legal basis, including the giving of a jury
instruction, at trial to support his assertion that he did not commit
was accused with the requisite mental state.

acts of which

(See Tr. and R.) As such, the district

court was compelled to find that Mr. Quezada established that his attorney's deficient
performance prejudiced him insofar as he waived his right to a trial without having been
informed of a critical defense to the crime to which he entered an Alford plea.
In light of the uncontroverted nature of the evidence of both deficient
performance and prejudice, Mr. Quezada asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his request for relief on this claim. As such, he respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the judgment of dismissal with respect to the claim on appeal, and remand
this matter for entry of an order setting aside his Alford plea, so that he may exercise
the right to a trial that he waived without the adequate and competent advice of counsel.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Quezada respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment denying him post-conviction relief on his claim, and remand this matter for
entry of an order setting aside his Alford plea.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2014.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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